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Savings—the Missing Element in  
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Cases?  
 
Abstract 
 
 This paper examines the effects of debtor savings on the viability of chapter 
13 bankruptcy plans.  The paper further examines the impact of lawyer culture, 
debtor participation in the bankruptcy process and judicial activism on the use of 
the savings program by chapter 13 debtors.  Using a data set of randomly selected 
chapter 13 bankruptcy cases filed in the Southern District of Texas, the analysis 
demonstrates that while savings has a direct positive impact on the success of 
chapter 13 plans, the degree of that success is significantly influenced by the views 
held by debtors’ lawyers, chapter 13 trustees and judges.   
 
Introduction 
 
 Conceptually, the notion of savings is simple.  Spend less than what you make 
and put a little away each month for an economic “rainy day.”  For those unprepared 
to weather the storm, bankruptcy is often the only option.  In 2005, Congress sought 
to reform the national bankruptcy law with the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”).  Under BAPCPA, 
individuals are required to submit to a “means test” to determine their bankruptcy 
alternatives.1   
                                                 
1    These alternatives generally include chapter 7, chapter 11 and chapter 13.  Chapter 9 applies 
solely to municipalities; chapter 12 to family farmers and fisherman; and chapter 15 to 
 Page 2 of 47 
 
One of the primary goals of BAPCPA is to force individual debtors toward 
chapter 13 and away from chapter 7.2  The underlying premise behind this policy is 
that debtors should pay as much as they can in exchange for a discharge of their 
debts.3  Under chapter 13, debtors are required to devote their “projected disposable 
income” for five years4 toward repayment of their creditors under a debt repayment 
plan.  If a monthly plan payment is missed, debtors are subject to having their cases 
dismissed and left with few protections from creditors other than to file another 
bankruptcy case.5  For the few debtors that successfully complete their chapter 13 
plan, they are rewarded with a discharge of all debts6 that existed at the time of the 
                                                 
international bankruptcy proceedings.  As explained below, chapter 7 and chapter 13 are the only 
practical alternatives for most individual debtors. 
  
2  For an analysis of chapter 7 versus chapter 13 filings pre-BAPCPA and post-BAPCPA, see 
Stephen Sather, The Great Bankruptcy Rush of 2005 and its Aftermath: The View from Texas, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J. 34 (Sept. 25, 2006); see also David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed 
Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 227. (Spring 2007) (asserting 
that BAPCPA has had no effect on the availability of chapter 7 to high income debtors). 
 
3   See infra Statement of President Bush at note 31. 
 
4   Under limited circumstances, a below-median debtor may be required to make payments of 
projected disposable income for as little as three years.  As this situation does not often occur, and 
to avoid unnecessarily complicating matters, all plan terms are assumed to be five years.  
 
5   See Tony Mecia, Beyond Bankruptcy: What Happens When You Fail Chapter 13, Credit Card 
News (October 29, 2015) (available at www.creditcards.com) (noting the importance of an 
individual’s credit score and that it may be impossible to repair a credit score if a bankruptcy case 
is dismissed). 
 
6   This statement is an overgeneralization for the sake of simplicity.  The scope of the discharge 
that a debtor receives in chapter 13 is limited by statute.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1328. 
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bankruptcy filing. These debtors, however, are too often returned to the status quo 
ante of a paycheck-to-paycheck existence with another mortgage payment due 
within thirty days.7  It is not surprising that approximately 38% of all chapter 13 
cases filed in 2016 were filed by debtors that had filed at least one chapter 13 case 
in the previous eight years.8 
Inherent in the “projected disposable income” approach9 implemented under 
BAPCPA is the premise that debtors live in a static financial environment for the 
entirety of a five-year plan term.  Common sense suggests otherwise.  Over time, a 
debtor’s income will vary for a variety of reasons, including reduced hours, unpaid 
leave to care for children, medical emergencies and temporary job loss.  On the 
expense side, unanticipated events such as car and home repairs, uninsured medical 
treatment and natural disasters10 routinely occur.  The impact of these events is 
heightened for those debtors who are required to pay all of their disposable income 
                                                 
7   Due to the practicalities of the process, it is not uncommon for several months to pass between 
the plan completion date and the closure date of a chapter 13 case.  Orders requiring debtors to 
resume making monthly mortgage payments directly to lenders often come 45-60 days after the 
date the first post-plan completion mortgage payment is due. 
 
8   2016 Report of Statistics Required by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 (available at www.uscourts.gov/statistics reports/bapcpa report 2016). 
 
9  See infra note 55. 
 
10  For instance, the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina was estimated to be $108 billion with at 
least $41 billion uninsured.  See Richard Knabb et al., HURRICANE KATRINA: AUGUST 23 – 30, 
2005, TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT, United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s National Weather Service. (December 20, 2005). 
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to the chapter 13 trustee based on a historical calculation that does not anticipate or 
allow for these unforeseen events.   
 In an effort to increase the feasibility and ultimate success11 of chapter 13 
plans under BAPCPA, the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Texas 
implemented a voluntary savings program in 2015 to provide a vehicle for debtors 
to weather the unexpected negative financial events that occur during the term of a 
chapter 13 plan.  Under this program, debtors may devote a small portion of their 
monthly plan payments to a savings account maintained by the chapter 13 trustee.  
There are no set minimum or maximum deposit amounts.  The deposit amounts may 
vary from month to month.  The program was designed to provide debtors with 
maximum flexibility to craft a plan suited to enhance their particular circumstances.  
The appropriateness of a proposed savings plan is reviewed on a case-by-case basis.  
Accumulated savings are available for withdrawal by debtors during the plan term 
to address unanticipated emergency situations.  One important feature of the 
                                                 
11   At this point, it would not be unfair to question why anyone other than the debtor would care 
about the success of a consumer bankruptcy case.  The potential financial impact of a change in 
the aggregate success of consumer bankruptcy cases, however, is huge.  For consumer bankruptcy 
cases filed in 2016, debtors reported aggregated assets of $72 billion and liabilities of $191 billion.  
See 2016 Report of Statistics Required by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 (available at www.uscourts.gov/statistics reports/bapcpa report 2016).  At 
any point in time, five years’ worth of cases are pending.  The financial impact is unmistakable 
whether measured in terms of market interest rate sensitivity, consumer debt portfolio pricing or 
actual recoverable distributions. 
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program is that any funds remaining in the savings account at the conclusion of the 
chapter 13 case are returned to the debtors.   
 This paper examines the impact of the savings program on chapter 13 
bankruptcy cases filed in the Southern District of Texas since the program’s 
implementation.  Included in this examination are the effects of debtors’ counsel, 
chapter 13 trustees and judges on the utilization of the savings program by chapter 
13 debtors.  Part I of this paper will provide a historical context for the passage of 
BAPCPA.  Part II will examine the legal basis for the creation of the savings program 
and the specific text of the relevant provisions of the Southern District of Texas form 
chapter 13 plan.  Part III will analyze the results of an empirical study of a sample 
of chapter 13 bankruptcy cases filed in the Southern District of Texas since the 
implementation of the savings plan provision.  Part IV will discuss the impact of 
debtors’ counsel, chapter 13 trustees and judges on debtors’ use of the savings 
program.  Part V concludes the paper with a discussion of potential changes to the 
program and recommendations to increase use of the program. 
Part I – Historical Framework 
 The authority of Congress to promulgate a system of national bankruptcy laws 
rests in the Constitution itself.12   Over a decade later in response to the Depression 
                                                 
12   U.S. CONST. art.1, § 8, cl. 4. (“The Congress shall have the Power to establish an uniform Rule 
of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States.”). 
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of 1793, Congress passed the first national bankruptcy law, The Bankruptcy Act of 
1800.13  This initial attempt at a national bankruptcy law closely followed 16th 
century English law and provided only for involuntary bankruptcy proceedings 
against merchant debtors.14  Treatment of debtors was harsh and likened debtors to 
criminals.15  In response to numerous complaints, the 1800 Act was repealed in 1803 
with the enactment of bankruptcy laws being left to the discretion of the states.16  An 
inconsistent scheme of patchwork laws and practices subsequently developed that 
provided little relief to debtors.17  
                                                 
 
13   See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248.  
For historical perspective, see David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, Faculty 
Scholarship. Paper 720 (1999) (available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty scholarship 
/720). 
 
14   David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, Faculty Scholarship. Paper 720 
(1999) (available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty scholarship /720). 
 
15  Id. See also Lauren Sylvester, Redefining Disposable Income in Chapter 13 Plans:  Moving 
Forward into a “New Era in the History of Bankruptcy Law”, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1107, 
1108-09 (2009).  Mercifully, the death penalty was omitted in favor of prison terms from one to 
ten years.  See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 18, 2 Stat. 26-27. 
 
16   See Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248.  In 1819, the Supreme Court barred states from 
granting discharges of claims held by citizens of other states. McMillan v. McNeill, 17 U.S. 209 
(1819). 
 
17   See Charles Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 5, 15-16 (1995). 
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 After the financial crisis of 1837, Congress tried again to implement a national 
bankruptcy law with The Bankruptcy Act of 1841.18   For the first time, individual 
debtors were allowed to file voluntary bankruptcy petitions and receive a discharge 
of their debts.19  Treatment of debtors, however, remained harsh.20 Even so, creditors 
reacted negatively, arguing that the new law was too permissive and costly.21  In 
response, and with the pending financial crisis averted, Congress repealed the 1841 
Act in 1843.22   
Subsequent to the financial hardships brought about by the Civil War, 
Congress tried for a third time in 1867 with the passage of The Bankruptcy Act of 
1867.23  The 1867 Act fared no better than its predecessors and was repealed in 1878 
in the face of similar criticisms.24 
                                                 
18   See Act of Aug. 1 9, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 
614. 
 
19  See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, Faculty Scholarship. Paper 
720 (1999) (available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty scholarship /720). 
 
20   Id. 
 
21  See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, Faculty Scholarship. Paper 
720 (1999) (available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty scholarship /720). 
 
22   See Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614. 
 
23   See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 
Stat. 99.  
 
24   See Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99.  Historians suggest that the ebb and flow of 
national bankruptcy laws was primarily due to political sentiment.  In response to financial 
downturns, the public demanded national bankruptcy policy and statutes were passed. Once the 
crisis subsided, federal intervention was no longer needed and the statutes were repealed with 
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 In July, 1898, Congress passed The National Bankruptcy Act of 1898.25  
Although subsequently amended on numerous occasions, the 1898 Act is the 
foundation for modern bankruptcy law as we know it.26  The Bankruptcy Code was 
created by one of those amendments, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.27   
The 1898 Act reversed the prior harsh views of debtors and recognized 
bankruptcy as an unfortunate outcome of commercial misfortune for which a degree 
of compassion was appropriate.28  Even the Supreme Court recognized this policy in 
the 1934 case of Local Loan Co. v. Hunt in which Justice Sutherland penned the 
                                                 
control being left to the individual states. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 
Bankruptcy Act, Faculty Scholarship. Paper 720 (1999) (available at 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty scholarship /720).  A particular problem suffered by the 
1867 Act was the perceived view by many southerners of “carpet bagging” federal judges 
responsible for administering the law.  Id.; See also Charles Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy 
Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 18-19 (1995). 
  
25   The National Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, chap. 541, 30 Stat. 544. 
  
26 See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, Faculty Scholarship. Paper 720 
(1999) (available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty scholarship /720); Charles Tabb, The 
History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 23-26 (1995). 
 
27   The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95–598, 92 Stat. 2549 (November 6, 1978).  The 
1978 Act also created the modern version of the bankruptcy court, although full implementation 
did not occur until 1984 due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline Construction 
Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) and the passage of reactive legislation by 
Congress in the Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 336 (July 10, 1984).  
Prior to the enactment of the 1978 Act, administrators of the bankruptcy process were referred to 
as referees and possessed little authority.  
 
28   Id. at 1109, n.12. 
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following oft-quoted passage that is generally regarded as the genesis of the notion 
that bankruptcy provides a “fresh start” to debtors: 
[The] purpose of the [Bankruptcy] act has been again and again 
emphasized by the courts as being of public and private interest, in that 
it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for 
distribution the property which he owns at the time of the bankruptcy, 
a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered 
by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.29 
 
This national pro-debtor policy continued until April 20, 2005 when BAPCPA 
was signed into law by President George W. Bush.30  In noting the intent and wide 
ranging effects of BAPCPA, President Bush stated, in part, that:  
[B]ankruptcy should always be a last resort in our legal system. If 
someone does not pay his or her debts, the rest of society ends up paying 
them. In recent years, too many people have abused the bankruptcy 
laws. They’ve walked away from debts even when they had the ability 
to repay them. . . .  The bill I sign today helps address this problem. 
Under the new law, Americans who have the ability to pay will be 
required to pay back at least a portion of their debts. . . . This practical 
reform will help ensure that debtors make a good-faith effort to repay 
as much as they can afford. 31 
In its debate about the need for bankruptcy reform, the House Judiciary 
Committee was more direct— 
                                                 
29  David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 224 (Spring 2007), quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 
(1934). 
 
30   Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).  The majority of the law’s provisions took effect on 
October 17, 2005. See S. 256, 109th Cong. § 1501 (2005). 
 
31   https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050420-5.html. 
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Shoplifting is wrong; . . . Bankruptcy is a moral as well as an economic 
act.  There is a conscious decision not to keep one’s promises.  It is a 
decision not to reciprocate a benefit received, a good deed done on the 
promise that you will reciprocate.  Promise-keeping and reciprocity are 
the foundation of an economy and healthy civil society.32 
 
Under modern bankruptcy law, an individual debtor generally has two 
practical options—chapter 7 or chapter 13.33  Under chapter 7, a debtor surrenders 
her non-exempt property to an independent trustee.34  The trustee then liquidates the 
property and distributes the proceeds to creditors in accordance with a statutory 
distribution scheme.35  The trustee is paid sixty dollars from the statutory filing fee 
plus a commission from any liquidation proceeds as compensation.36  Absent a 
formal  objection, the debtor is entitled to a discharge of her debts37 sixty days after 
                                                 
32   H.R. Rep. No. 31, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005); see also Sara Sternberg Greene, The Failed 
Reform; Congressional Crackdown on Repeat Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filers, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
241 (Spring 2015). 
 
33  An individual debtor is also entitled to file chapter 11.  11 U.S.C. § 109(d).  An individual 
chapter 11 case is problematic, however, for many reasons including cost of the process and 
controlling precedent regarding application of the absolute priority rule.  See Dill Oil Co. v. 
Stephens (In re Stephens), 704 F. 3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2013); In re Lively, 717 F. 3d 406 (5th Cir. 
2013); Maharaj v. Stubbs & Perdue, P.A (In re Maharaj), 681 F.3d 558 (4th Cir. 2012). 
  
34   See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 704. 
 
35   See 11 U.S.C. § 726. 
 
36   See 11 U.S.C. §§ 326 (commission) and 330(b) ($60 fee). 
 
37   The discharge covers all debts that arose before the date the bankruptcy case was filed as well 
as certain debts that arise after the filing but which the Bankruptcy Code deems to have arisen 
prior to the filing date.   11 U.S.C. § 727(b).  Certain categories of debts, however, are excluded.  
11 U.S.C. § 523. 
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the first scheduled date for the meeting of creditors under 11 U.S.C § 341 even 
though the case may last significantly longer.38  Subject to a few limited exceptions, 
any property received by the debtor after the case is filed is retained by the debtor 
free of any claim of the chapter 7 trustee or pre-bankruptcy creditors.39   
Under BAPCPA, an individual debtor filing chapter 13 is required to make 
monthly payments of her projected disposable income40 over a term of 60 months41 
pursuant to a written plan.42  The debtor retains all of her property and receives a 
discharge only upon completion of all payments required under her plan.43  The 
chapter 13 trustee is paid a statutory commission of no more than 10% of the 
distributions made under the debtor’s plan.44  One primary difference between 
                                                 
38   11 U.S.C. § 727; FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004. 
 
39   See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).  By way of example, a debtor that buys a winning lottery ticket on her 
way to the courthouse to file a chapter 7 bankruptcy case would be required to turn the winning 
lottery ticket over to the trustee while the debtor that buys the same winning ticket on her way 
home from the courthouse after the case is filed would get to keep the winnings free of any claims 
of creditors or the bankruptcy trustee, assuming of course, that the dollar that purchased the 
winning ticket was not in her pocket on her way to the courthouse. 
 
40   See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b). 
 
41   As previously mentioned in note 4, supra, under certain circumstances, the plan term can be 
less than 60 months but never longer.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d).  
 
42   11 U.S.C. § 1321. 
 
43   11 U.S.C. § 1328. 
 
44   11 U.S.C. § 330; 28 U.S.C. § 586(e).  The calculation is fairly complex but in general, the fee 
is an allocation of the total costs of a chapter 13 trustee’s operation subject to a 10% ceiling. See 
Laughlin, Kathleen A., The Standing Chapter 13 Trustee’s Percentage Fee: Solving an Algebraic 
Equation, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 823 (1991).  This approach can result in debtors in smaller or 
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chapter 7 and chapter 13 in the fee calculation is that in chapter 13, the debtor 
generally bears the cost of the trustee’s commission.45 
  Prior to 1984, a debtor’s selection of chapter 7 versus chapter 13 was a 
strategic decision tailored to the needs of the individual debtor.  This choice was 
limited in 1984 when Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) which provided for either 
dismissal or conversion to chapter 13 of a chapter 7 case that constitutes an “abuse 
of the provisions of this chapter [7].”46  The determination of whether abuse existed 
has generally focused on the debtor’s ability to repay a portion of her debts from 
future income.47  A presumption of abuse exists if the debtor’s current monthly 
income less allowable expenses multiplied by sixty is not less than the lesser of (i) 
twenty-five percent of the debtor’s nonpriority unsecured debts or $7,475, whichever 
is greater; or (ii) $12,475.48  
                                                 
less efficiently run jurisdictions paying more than debtors in larger or more efficiently run 
jurisdictions.   
 
45   There are certain situations when the amount of the debtor’s monthly plan payment required 
by applicable law would not be affected by the chapter 13 trustee’s statutory fee.  In such a case, 
one can legitimately argue that general unsecured creditors bear the cost of the fee as in a chapter 
7 case.  These situations do not often occur but they do exist. 
 
46   For a discussion of the implementation of § 707(b), see David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: 
The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 225-27. (Spring 
2007). 
 
47  See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 492-93 (Summer 2005). 
 
48    11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2). 
 
 Page 13 of 47 
 
The language of § 707(b) formalized a judge’s discretion to dismiss or convert 
a chapter 7 case based on the circumstances of the particular case.49  With the passage 
of BAPCPA, however, the discretion available to a judge under § 707(b) yielded to 
the mechanical application of the means test. 
 The means test is set forth in current versions of 11 U.S.C. §§ 707 and 1325.  
The process begins with the requirement that a debtor file certain financial 
information with the Court.50  Bankruptcy Rule 1007(b)(6) requires that 
[a] debtor in a chapter 13 case shall file a statement of current monthly 
income, prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official Form, and, 
if the current monthly income exceeds the median family income for 
the applicable state and household size, a calculation of disposable 
income made in accordance with §1325(b)(3), prepared as prescribed 
by the appropriate Official Form. 
 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007.   Current monthly income under BAPCPA is defined as the 
average of all income earned by a debtor in the six-month period preceding the 
bankruptcy filing.51  Disposable income is defined as a debtor’s current monthly 
                                                 
49   While a certain amount of discretion is appropriate, the dangers of leaving total discretion to 
the judge to determine “what is too much” are obvious.  The intersection of a particular judge’s 
ideological makeup and a debtor’s lifestyle choice is destined to produce unpredictability, a lack 
of transparency and inconsistent results.   By way of example, does a judge who is married, 
devotedly religious and a career government servant view an unmarried exotic dancer with two 
children seeking to retain two $35,000 vehicles differently than an unmarried judge with 
significant net worth and a long history in private practice prior to taking the bench?  Theoretically, 
both learned judges should reach consistent, but perhaps not exact, conclusions.  Common sense 
suggests to the contrary. 
 
50   The failure to timely file all of the information required by 11 U.S.C. § 521 results in the 
automatic dismissal of the case.  See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i). 
 
51   11 U.S.C. § 101(10A). 
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income, not including child support, foster care and disability payments, less 
reasonable living expenses.52  The process then starts to get complicated as debtors 
are treated differently based on whether their income is above or below the median 
family income for a comparably-sized family in their resident state.53   
 Section 1325(b) requires the commitment of all of a debtor’s projected 
disposable income during the plan period.54  BAPCPA provides no statutory 
definition or guidance on the impact of the word “projected.”  As currently 
developed, projected disposable income is accepted as a forward looking 
requirement based on a six-month historical average of a debtor’s income.55  This 
                                                 
 
52   11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2). 
 
53   The calculations contained in Official Form B22C are complex.  An attorney representing a 
debtor would never attempt to complete the form without the use of a computer program 
specifically designed to perform the calculations.  Pro se debtors are at a significant disadvantage 
because the available software is expensive and good alternatives that produce correct results are 
extremely rare. 
 
54   11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1). 
 
55   For a discussion of these concepts, see Chelsey Tulis, Get Real: Reframing the Debate Over 
How to Calculate Projected Disposable Income in § 1325(B), 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 345 (2009).  
Also, courts have struggled with the meaning of the term “projected.”  Some courts applied a 
mechanical approach with no variance for future considerations.  Other courts applied a more 
forward-thinking approach to account for known future changes.  In 2010, the Supreme Court 
adopted the forward-looking approach and held that projected disposable income is calculated by 
starting with the historical calculation and making adjustments for known future changes.  See 
Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S.Ct. 2464 (2010).  The issue of unforeseeable events remains 
unaddressed. 
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process differs from past practice when the metric was just disposable income 
measured by the difference between Schedules I and J.56 
The current structure under BAPCPA leaves the individual chapter 13 debtor 
in the position of being able to succeed in a chapter 13 plan only if (i) the debtor’s 
income is steady or rising; and (ii) the debtor encounters no significant unanticipated 
financial events during the plan term; or worse, the debtor creates a cushion by 
ignoring the oath attached to the official forms and inappropriately manipulates 
monthly expense numbers.  Rather than leave debtors exposed to these risks, the 
bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Texas decided on an innovative 
approach designed to implement debtor savings as part of the chapter 13 process. 
Part II – The Savings Plan 
For the twelve month period ending March 31, 2017, the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts reported that 298,348 new chapter 13 cases were filed.57 It 
is estimated that approximately two-thirds of these cases will fail.58  The primary 
                                                 
56  Schedule I reflects a debtor’s income while Schedule J reflects a debtor’s expenses at the time 
of the bankruptcy filing.  See Official Form B106I (Schedule I) 
(http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/individual-debtors/schedule-i-your-income-individuals) and 
Official Form B106J (Schedule J) (http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/individual-debtors/ schedule-
j-your-expenses-individuals). 
 
57   See U.S. Bankruptcy Courts - Business and Nonbusiness Cases Filed, by Chapter of the 
Bankruptcy Code Table, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Table F-2 (available at 
uscourts.gov). 
   
58  Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEX. 
LAW REV. 103, 113 (November 2011). 
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reason for failure is nonpayment of the monthly plan payments.59  In recognition of 
this reality, the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Texas undertook an 
coordinated effort to find a solution consistent with the Bankruptcy Code that would 
increase the success of chapter 13 plans.   
Beginning in 2012, the court began to study the underlying reasons why 
chapter 13 cases fail and to examine potential solutions.  Initially, alternatives were 
suggested by the court and incorporated into individual plans on an ad hoc basis with 
receptive attorneys.  The impact of the chosen alternative was then informally 
observed and incorporated into subsequent cases. 
During this process, the court identified a number of criteria that any solution 
must address.  First, the solution had to provide an economic buffer to allow debtors 
to survive unexpected financial distress.  Second, the solution had to provide the 
individual debtor with a demonstrative and immediate benefit to entice participation.  
Third, the debtor’s bar had to be receptive to the solution.  Inherent in the court’s 
                                                 
59   In 2016, the failure to make plan payments accounted for approximately 53% of all dismissals 
of chapter 13 cases.  See BAPCPA Report – 2016, Table 6, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts – Chapter 13 
individual Debtor Cases with Primarily Consumer Debts closed by Dismissal or Plan Completion 
During 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2016, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
(available at uscourts.gov).  Personal experience suggests that the percentage is significantly 
higher for post-confirmation dismissals. 
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analysis was the assumption that chapter 13 trustees would uniformly support the 
provision and its implementation.60  
These considerations led to the court’s adoption in 2014 of a savings program 
to be incorporated into its prescribed chapter 13 form plan.61   Participation in the 
program is voluntary and is invoked simply by inserting an amount to be allocated 
to savings in the relevant paragraph using the “check the box” methodology.  The 
amount allocated to savings does not have to be consistent and can even be a single 
event structured to capture unique occurrences such as the receipt of a tax refund.  
The current savings provision reads as follows:62 
21. Emergency Savings Fund.  Line 21 of Schedule J (the Debtor(s)’ expense 
budget) includes a provision for an emergency savings fund by the 
Debtor(s).  Deposits into the Emergency Savings Fund will be made to the 
Trustee.  Withdrawals from the Emergency Savings Fund may be made by 
application to the Court, utilizing the form application from the Court’s 
website.  Withdrawals should be requested only in an emergency.  The form 
application need only be served electronically, and only to persons 
subscribing to the Court’s CM/ECF electronic noticing system.  An 
application will be deemed granted on the 15th day after filing unless (i) an 
objection has been filed; or (ii) the Court has set a hearing on the 
application.  The Debtor(s) may request emergency consideration of any 
                                                 
60   As set forth in detail in Part III below, this assumption was incorrect.  The views held by chapter 
13 trustees vary and have a significant impact on the use of the savings program by chapter 13 
debtors. 
 
61   The form plan incorporating the savings provision took effect January 1, 2015. 
 
62  Uniform Plan and Motion for Valuation of Collateral (Local Form available at 
http://www.txs.uscourts.gov/sites/txs/files/1115plansavingsmods.pdf). The court has recently 
supplemented the language of the provision to reflect experience and to integrate other new 
features into the form plan such escrows for non-escrowed ad valorem taxes, homeowner 
association assessments and self-employment taxes that have resulted from the perceived success 
of the savings program.  The current language has not substantively changed the nature of the 
savings provisions from the original version.  The new version will take effect December 1, 2017. 
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application filed under this paragraph.  The balance, if any, in the 
Emergency Savings Fund will be paid to the Debtor(s) following (i) the 
granting of the discharge in this case; (ii) the dismissal of this case; or (iii) 
the conversion of this case to a case under chapter 7, except under those 
circumstances set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(2). 
 
The deposits into the Emergency Savings Fund will be: 
 
Month of First Deposit 
of this Amount 
Month of Last Deposit 
of this Amount 
Amount Total 
    
    
  TOTAL  
 
Funds paid to the Trustee will not be credited to the Emergency Savings Fund 
unless, at the time of receipt by the Trustee, the Debtor(s) are current on payments9 
provided for the in the Plan that are to be distributed to creditors or that are to be 
reserved under Paragraph 22.  After funds have been credited to the Emergency 
Savings Fund, they may only be withdrawn in accordance with this paragraph. 
 
9  If the Debtor(s)’ payments are made by a wage order that is routinely paying 
the Trustee, the Debtor(s) will be considered “current” for the purposes of 
this Paragraph and Paragraph 22 if the Debtor(s) are less than 1 month 
delinquent in their plan payments. 
 
Two important facets of the savings provision should be noted.  First, any 
funds that are held by the chapter 13 trustee at the case’s conclusion are returned to 
the debtor.63  This distribution occurs whether (i) the case is converted to chapter 7; 
(ii) the case is dismissed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307; or (iii) a discharge is granted 
or denied under 11 U.S.C. § 1328.  Second, the savings provision contains a 
withdrawal mechanism for emergencies.  The withdrawal process was designed to 
                                                 
63   Consider the social impact of having an individual debtor emerge from chapter 13 with a 
discharge and a savings account for future contingencies.  Ignoring for the moment the ability to 
withstand a future economic shock, if the experience fosters a change in future behavior or the 
lesson is passed on to a future generation, the benefits are immeasurable. 
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be a self-effectuating and a cost-effective procedure using a very simple form that 
does not require an attorney’s involvement.  In essence, the debtor is required only 
to specify the amount requested to be withdrawn and the reason for the withdrawal.  
The form is currently being integrated into the court’s electronic filing system so 
that no paper form will be required, thereby further decreasing any associated cost.   
The legal basis for the savings provision is relatively simple.  For below-
median64 debtors, disposable income is based on a debtor’s forecasted income and 
expenses as of the filing date, including “the full amount for ‘maintenance or 
support.’ ”65  The current Official Form B106J (Schedule J) is intended to reflect a 
debtor’s expenses.  The form includes expense categories which necessarily require 
monthly estimates such as property taxes (line 4a), insurance (line 4b), property 
repairs, maintenance and upkeep (line 4c), car repairs and maintenance (line 12) and 
medical and dental expenses (line 11) even though these types of expenses typically 
occur as single events.  Line 21 provides a space for “Other.”  In reality, debtors do 
                                                 
64   Use of the savings plan becomes slightly more problematic with an above-median debtor due 
to the expense provisions of § 1325(b) even though the identical expenses are allowed.  The general 
effect of these provisions is that use of the savings provision may cause the monthly plan payment 
of the above-median debtor to increase.  Other factors such as the amount of secured debt and the 
best-interest test may also limit the use of the savings provision.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
above-median debtors often need a mechanism for disciplined savings to a greater extent than 
below-median debtors.  Based on the results of the data collected in the study discussed in Part III 
below, above-median debtors do not participate in the savings program. 
 
65   Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 510 (2010). 
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not save for these events.  These numbers typically operate only as plugs in an 
unrealistic budget used primarily for the purpose of obtaining the chapter 13 trustee’s 
support for confirmation of the plan.66 
  Official Form B106I (Schedule I) reflects a debtor’s forecasted income and 
includes provisions for voluntary contributions to savings vehicles such as 
retirement plans.67  It logically follows that by utilizing the savings provision and 
inserting a real and measurable number into Line 21 that is administered by the 
chapter 13 trustee and overseen by the court, a debtor’s ability to meet a future 
economic shock event with accumulated savings becomes real.  
Once the language of the savings provision was approved, the court 
recognized the need for interaction with the bar to discuss the provision and its 
implementation if the program was to succeed.  The court prepared and engaged in 
a series of presentations that were designed to provide a forum for education and 
discussion.  To encourage participation, (i) continuing legal education credit was 
offered to all participants; (ii) multiple judges participated in each presentation; and 
                                                 
66   It is not unusual to see manipulation of budget numbers to “create” feasibility in tight cases.  
For instance, a debtor might reduce a food budget to an unrealistic number to create enough income 
to satisfy the statutory tests.  These types of manipulation generally work only in the short run and 
can have negative consequences for both debtors and their counsel if noticed and upon inquiry, the 
debtor answers that she knows the number is wrong but her lawyer told her that she had to use the 
number so that the court would approve the plan. 
   
67   See In re Miner, 2017 WL 1011419 (W.D. La., March 14, 2017) (allowing a 3% of income 
contribution to a 401(k) plan under a chapter 13 plan). 
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(iii) the presentations were offered during the noon hour on days when a large 
number of consumer bankruptcy practitioners were expected to be in the courthouse. 
The savings program took effect on January 1, 2015.  As of approximately 
June 1, 2017, the sum of $756,167 was on deposit in the savings program with the 
two chapter 13 trustees that were included in the study described in Part III below. 
Part III – An Empirical Study 
 To test the effectiveness of the savings program, this paper presents the results 
of an empirical study of chapter 13 cases filed after the program’s implementation.  
In order to determine the impact of the savings program, it is first necessary to define 
the measure of success.  This definition is complicated by the unavoidable fact that 
the natural measure of success would be a comparison of plan completion rates of 
similarly-situated debtors utilizing the savings provision to those debtors that chose 
not to use the provision.  As the savings program was not formally implemented 
until January 1, 2015, a meaningful data set for such a comparison does not yet exist.  
The available data is, however, sufficient to highlight the benefits of the savings 
concept and promote a discussion among both courts and commentators.  
Subsequent studies will examine the savings program’s long-term effects and 
recommend improvements to improve plan feasibility.  An increase in feasible plans 
means more debtors will complete their plans and receive their discharges.  An 
increase in plan completion rates also means that secured creditors receive more 
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payments on their debts and that unsecured creditors receive more meaningful 
distributions.   
Accordingly, for purposes of the study reflected in this paper, success is 
defined as an increase in plan feasibility.  Plan feasibility is measured based on the 
length of time between the filing of the bankruptcy case and a dismissal.  Obviously, 
cases that remained pending as of the date of the study will cause this measure to be 
understated.  The study attempts to compensate for this fact by separately examining 
the differences between plans utilizing the savings provision and those that don’t on 
a number of different bases, including pre and post-confirmation dismissal rates, in 
order to view variations from multiple perspectives.   
The dataset for the study consists of a random selection of 350 chapter 13 
cases filed in the Southern District of Texas since the implementation of the savings 
program.68  The data was selected and coded from January - March, 2017.  Although 
subject to a level of imprecision, the term, “the date of the study” is defined as 
December 31, 2016.   
The only limiting criteria imposed in the selection of cases was that the cases 
had to be assigned to one of two particular judges in the Houston, Victoria or Laredo 
                                                 
68   The random selection of cases began with cases having a petition date of July 1, 2015, or after 
to allow 180 days for debtors and their lawyers to become better educated and properly evaluate 
the merits of the savings program.  This may or may not have been a sufficient amount of time as 
change generally comes slowly to large institutions.  
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divisions of the Southern District of Texas.  This limitation was required for several 
reasons.  First, all of the cases filed in these divisions are administered by one of two 
chapter 13 trustees.  These two trustees are at the forefront of national chapter 13 
bankruptcy policy and are generally recognized as two of the finest chapter 13 
trustees in the country.  Historically, these two trustees exhibit general similarity in 
their administration of chapter 13 cases.  It was believed that any chapter 13 trustee 
bias in the analysis would therefore be minimized or, at worst, consistent.69     
   Second, the two judges that were selected were the two most active 
proponents of the savings program, with one being its creator and both being the 
provision’s drafters.  The Southern District of Texas has six bankruptcy judgeships.  
Although the savings program was unanimously adopted by the court, the judges 
expressed differing views about the utility of the savings program at the time of its 
approval.  The two selected judges have formal education and prior work experience 
in the area of finance prior to taking the bench. Both judges had active debtor 
practices prior to taking the bench.  The two selected judges also hold similar views 
on the importance of savings in creating debtor financial responsibility.  Again, the 
intent of the limitation was to minimize judge bias, or, at least to achieve a consistent 
level of bias.  It was believed that, at worst, consistent bias would not be 
                                                 
69   As discussed below, this belief was incorrect. 
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substantively reflected in the relative measure of the life span of chapter 13 plans 
between debtors who utilize the savings program and those who elected not to use 
the provision.  Moreover, at the time of the study, the two chapter 13 trustees both 
appeared before the two selected judges, although not with equal frequency.  Trustee 
1 appeared only before Judge 2 while Trustee 2 appeared before both Judge 1 and 
Judge 2.70  
From the 350 selected cases, 11 cases were deleted from the data sample as 
containing conditions that could not be adequately accounted for and had a tendency 
to skew the data for inapplicable reasons.  These conditions included: (i) the death 
of a debtor during the case; (ii) the filing of a divorce proceeding by a debtor;71 (iii) 
the approval of a home loan modification that required (or resulted in) the dismissal 
of the bankruptcy case; and (iv) a significant medical event or injury that required 
the debtor’s hospitalization for an extended period of time and that resulted in the 
dismissal of the case.  Of the remaining 339 cases, the study first looked at the overall 
use of the savings provision. Table 1 below reflects the results. 
                                                 
70   Based on recent changes in division assignments of judges, both trustees now appear before 
both judges.   
 
71   Cases involving a divorce are often filed for strategic litigation reasons with a subsequent 
dismissal being contemplated at the initiation of the case.  While a divorce could certainly be 
considered to be an unforeseen financial shock event, there are simply too many variables and the 
removal of cases involving a divorce did not significantly affect the sample size as the total subset 
of all 11 deleted cases accounted for only 3.14% of the data sample. 
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Table 1 
      Cases Cases pending at 
time of study 
Plans using the savings provision 94 55 
Plans not using the savings provision 245 124 
% using the savings provision 27.73%  
% not using savings provision 72.27%  
% of plans w/ savings pending  58.51% 
% of plans w/o savings pending  50.61% 
 
Most strikingly, the use of the savings provision occurred in only 27.73% of the 
cases.  This figure is surprising.  The economic and social cost to a debtor of 
invoking the savings provision is zero.  The amount of the monthly plan payment is 
unaffected.  There are no additional fees incurred or requirements for additional 
court appearances.  No stigma is attached.  To the contrary, both Judge 1 and Judge 
2 routinely compliment the “wisdom” of debtors that choose to participate in the 
program.  With no additional cost, it seems logical that one would always prefer to 
settle one’s debts for less and keep the difference than pay more for the identical 
result.   
 The data also reflects that at the time of the study, 58.51% of the plans 
invoking the savings provisions remained pending versus 50.61% of plans that did 
not utilize the savings provision.  While arguably significant, this result is easily 
affected by a number of factors, including the timing of the bankruptcy filing itself 
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in relation to the study.  In order to reach a reasoned conclusion on the meaning of 
the difference, several other measures require examination, including the possible 
effects of potential bias exhibited by the chapter 13 trustee and the presiding judge. 
 In order to test the effects of potential judge and trustee bias, the study first 
looked that the distribution of cases by trustee as well as the number of cases that 
utilized the savings provision.  Second, the study examined the distribution of cases 
by judge on the same basis.  The findings are represented by the following tables: 
Table 2 
 Trustee 1 Trustee 2 
Cases 118 221 
Cases w/Savings 23 71 
% Cases w/Savings 19.49% 32.13% 
 
Chi2 = 6.11572 
P = .0134 
 
Table 3 
 Judge 1 Judge 2 
Cases 159 180 
Cases w/Savings 56 38 
% Cases w/Savings 35.22% 21.11% 
 
Chi2 = 8.363 
P = .0038 
                                                 
72   All statistical tests were performed using the Medcalc statistical software calculator available 
at https://www.medcalc.org. 
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The distribution of total cases between trustees is not surprising.  Trustee 2 appears 
before both Judge 1 and Judge 2 while Trustee 1 appears only before Judge 2.  The 
distribution of cases between judges is likewise not surprising.  The division of work 
between all bankruptcy judges in the Southern District of Texas is governed by a 
work order.  The case assignment percentages in the work order is adjusted 
throughout the year as required.  Both judges in the study are assigned cases in 
multiple divisions within the Southern District of Texas.  The assignment 
percentages are based on several factors including overall workload, travel 
requirements and divisional caseloads.  It is noted that all chapter 13 cases assigned 
to Judge 2 involve either Trustee 1 or Trustee 2.  Judge 1, however, receives case 
assignments from Trustee 2 as well as the District’s third trustee that was not 
included in the study.  After a comprehensive review of these factors, there appear 
to be no abnormalities in the distribution of cases.   
The statistics regarding plans using the savings provision reflect that, on a 
percentage basis, significantly more cases administered by Trustee 2 invoke the 
savings provision that those cases administered by Trustee 1.  This result suggests 
that the assumption that Trustee 1 and Trustee 2 hold similar views about the savings 
provision may be incorrect.  To test the assumption, an informal survey with a cross-
section of the 48 firms noted below was performed during a series of educational 
seminars which yielded an interesting trend.  The attorneys surveyed stated that 
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Trustee 1 consistently conveyed a resistance to utilization of the savings provision 
on anything more than a minimal basis.  This resistance conveyed a sense to the 
attorneys that the savings program should not be used.  This unwritten policy appears 
to have resulted in some practitioners abandoning use of the savings provision 
altogether in cases administered by Trustee 1 in order to avoid perceived conflicts 
with Trustee 1.73   
Support for this trustee policy was noted by examining the results of Table 2 
reflecting the distribution by judge of plans employing the savings provisions.  As 
noted, 35.22% of the cases filed before Judge 1 utilized the savings provision while 
only 21.11% of the plans filed before Judge 2 invoked the provision.  Recall that 
Trustee 1 appears only before Judge 2.  The conclusion regarding the negative 
influence of Trustee 1 on use of the savings program is supported although it does 
not fully explain the differences between the two judges. 
Although not anticipated, these initial inquiries suggest that a chapter 13 
trustee’s views on the savings provision have an impact on its use by debtors.  The 
results also suggest that debtors’ counsel have substantial influence on the debtor’s 
                                                 
73   This phenomenon exists in the debtor attorneys’ bar and routinely surfaces as a motivating 
factor in decision making by attorneys.  At a given time, most practitioners will have multiple 
cases being administered by the same chapter 13 trustee.  Many attorneys worry that by taking an 
adverse position in one case, a spillover effect will occur affecting the success or failure of other 
cases and generally making practice before that trustee more difficult.  The impact of this concern 
is more fully discussed in Part IV. 
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decision to utilize the savings provision.  Further examination of the impact these 
institutions have on the savings program will be made in Part IV. 
Because two ideologically similar judges produced such different results, the 
study informally examined the practices employed by both judges with respect to 
the savings program.  As a result of that inquiry, a major practice difference was 
noted.  Both Judge 1 and Judge 2 believe that special emphasis on the use of the 
savings program is appropriate under certain circumstances such as repeat 
bankruptcy filings. Judge 1, however, strongly recommends and occasionally 
mandates the use of the savings provision in these circumstances while Judge 2 only 
ensures that debtors are personally aware of the savings program and its benefits but 
does not require its use as a condition to proceeding in a subsequent case.    
 To test the impact of judicial encouragement on the use of the savings 
provision, the study examined cases pending at the time of the study by judge.74  The 
results are represented in Table 4. 
Table 4 
                                                 
74   To be clear, this data focuses only cases that remained pending at the time of the study 
regardless of the date the case was filed. 
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 Judge 1 Judge 2 
Pending Cases 84 95 
Pending Cases 
w/Savings 34 21 
% Cases w/Savings 40.48% 22.11% 
 
Chi2 = 7.028 
P = .0080 
 
The foregoing data, when compared to results set forth in Table 3 of plans originally 
filed using the savings plans suggests that strongly encouraging or even mandating 
that a debtor invoke the savings provision has no apparent negative impact on plan 
feasibility.  To the contrary, the data suggests that once the savings provision is 
invoked and the chapter 13 plan confirmed, debtors that were required or strongly 
encouraged to use the savings provision perform better than debtors that voluntarily 
chose to participate.  The data further suggests that debtor education about the 
program and subsequent “debtor vesting” in the completion of the chapter 13 plan 
play a significant role in the outcome—an unanticipated upshot that will be further 
examined below. 
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 The study next looked at the average time periods between the filing date and 
date of disposition for chapter 13 cases that were not pending at the time of the study.  
The cases were divided into two categories—cases that were dismissed prior to 
confirmation of the chapter 13 plan and cases that were dismissed after confirmation 
of a plan.  The basis for this division is that cases dismissed prior to confirmation 
are presumed to have other statutory or practical problems that would skew the data 
for plans that are approved as complying with applicable law.  The results of the 
analysis regarding cases that are dismissed prior to confirmation are set forth in the 
following chart. 
Chart 1 
The foregoing reflects a 52-day increase in the length of cases that are dismissed 
prior to confirmation and that utilize the savings provision. A comparison of the 
calculated averages reveals a T-value of 3.233 and a P-value of .0016.  Conventional 
wisdom suggests that this result may actually be undesirable as cases that cannot 
113
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ultimately be confirmed should be promptly dismissed.  Alternatively, it may be that 
the savings program is allowing debtors to explore all possible alternatives prior to 
dismissal.  Given BAPCPA’s stated purpose of curbing repeat filers, perhaps this is 
indeed the desired result.  The increase could also be attributable to better educated 
counsel whose skill set and knowledge of the law allow them to keep a case alive 
longer than those less skilled.  The possibilities are endless.   
 Based on the initial results of the effects of the selection of chapter 13 trustee 
as well as the particular judge presiding over the case, the study next parsed the 
above results based on trustee and judge selection.  The findings by trustee 
assignment are represented by Chart 2. 
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Chart 2 
This analysis reflects that all cases regardless of the use of the savings provision 
remain pending longer if administered by Trustee 1 than if administered by Trustee 
2.  Recall, Trustee 2 appears before both Judge 1 and Judge 2 while Trustee 1 only 
appears before Judge 2.  A statistical comparison of the averages yields the following 
information: 
No Savings Tvalue:  1.911  Pvalue:  .0592  NT1=33  NT2=58 
Savings  Tvalue:  1.956  Pvalue:  .0682  NT1=7  NT2=11 
 
To fully understand the conclusions suggested by Chart 2, the results must be 
considered concurrently with the data grouped by judge as set forth in Chart 3. 
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Chart 3 
 The foregoing comparison suggests a bias between the two judges in their 
administration of chapter 13 plans.  Interestingly, although cases remain pending 
longer before Judge 2, the relative difference between cases invoking the savings 
provision and those that did not are similar—49 days for Judge 1 and 56 days for 
Judge 2.  A statistical comparison of the averages yields the following: 
No Savings Tvalue:  -2.471 Pvalue:  .0154  NJ1=42  NJ2=49 
Savings  Tvalue:  -1.163 Pvalue:  .2619  NJ1=9   NJ2=9 
 
The foregoing suggests another influence at work.  Based on informal discussions 
between the two judges, a substantive difference was noted regarding the use of 
“catch-up” payments75 to cure payment deficiencies.  Judge 1 is more stringent in 
                                                 
75   The “catch-up” payment program is a device created and implemented by Judge 1 and Judge 
2 that may be applied in chapter 13 cases where the proposed plan meets the statutory requirements 
for confirmation but the debtor is behind in her required monthly payments.  Both Judge 1 and 
Judge 2 will require a debtor to appear monthly before the court and make a regular payment plus 
some amount toward the deficiency amount until the debtor is current.  Judge 1 and Judge 2 differ, 
however, in the requirements for being eligible to participate in the catch-up program as well as 
94
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the use of this mechanism than Judge 2.  To understand whether the increased 
flexibility incorporated by Judge 2 in the application of “catch-up” payments has a 
significant impact on the success of chapter 13 cases, a future study would need to 
examine plan completion rates using this distinction. 
 The identical analysis was applied to cases that were dismissed after 
confirmation. The results of the analysis are set forth in Charts 4, 5 and 6. 
Chart 4 
Tvalue:  1.394 Pvalue:  .1697  Nsavings=21  Nno savings=30 
 
The data reflects a 51-day increase in the length of chapter 13 plans that are 
dismissed after confirmation that utilize the savings provision versus those plans that 
do not use the provision.  This is the expected result based on the underlying premise 
                                                 
the number of months in which they will allow a deficiency to be cured and the extent to which 
they will consider reasons for noncompliance.  
409
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that the savings provision is beneficial.  To understand the impact of any potential 
bias, the study again looked at these results by trustee assignment as well as by judge.   
Chart 5 
 
No Savings Tvalue:  -2.026 Pvalue:  .0524  NJ1=11  NJ2=19 
Savings  Tvalue:  -2.270 Pvalue:  .0350  NJ1=13  NJ2=8 
 
Chart 6 
No Savings Tvalue:  0.608  Pvalue:  .5479  NT1=10  NT2=20 
Savings  Tvalue:  1.700  Pvalue:  .1055  NT1=3  NT2=18 
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The foregoing analysis supports the prior notion that a judge bias exists in the 
administration of chapter 13 plans.  Again, the measurement of the relative 
difference between the two dates appears to have a netting effect (62 days – Judge 
1, 93 days – Judge 2) although not as much as existed in the pre-confirmation 
dismissal data.  This comparison suggests that Judge 2 disproportionately rewards 
debtors that confirm a plan using the savings provision. 
Moreover, looking at the absolute differences in the measures yields an 
interesting result.  The absolute time differentials between dismissed plans that 
utilize the savings provisions and those that do not are 51 days for post-confirmation 
dismissals and 54 days for pre-confirmation dismissals.  When one accounts for the 
fact that dismissal dockets in the Southern District of Texas generally occur on a 
monthly basis, the data reflects that plans that invoke the savings provisions last, on 
average, an extra two months during which debtors have an opportunity to work 
through their difficulties although the variation between judges becomes much more 
pronounced in the post-confirmation period than in the pre-confirmation period. 
 The above analysis establishes that the savings program has a positive effect 
of the success of chapter 13 plans. An average increase of two months in the average 
length of dismissed cases is an extremely encouraging result, especially in view of 
the fact that plans which remained pending are not accounted for in the study.  The 
analysis suggests, however, that the ultimate success of the savings program is 
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affected both by chapter 13 trustees and judges.  Extrapolating the study data to a 
five-year term which would encompass the “pending cases” would result in 
significantly more plans reaching their term—a conclusion that, alone, would be 
satisfactory.  
In reviewing the cases that were the subject of the study, however, a very 
interesting fact surfaced.  In none of the dismissed cases did the debtor ever seek to 
withdraw the accumulated savings.  Of all 94 cases in the data sample that utilized 
the savings provision, only seven requests for withdrawals were made—all in cases 
that remained pending as of the date of this study.  This discovery reflects that: (i) 
debtors are successfully using the savings program to manage unanticipated 
financial shocks to keep their cases pending; and (ii) the savings program is 
providing an unanticipated benefit termed an increase in “debtor feasibility.” 
The data suggests that when invoking the savings provision and receiving 
positive feedback, debtors are becoming more vested in the bankruptcy process and 
are devoting more effort to making their plans work.  This is debtor feasibility.  Five 
years is a long time to sacrifice for a past financial difficulty that becomes more 
distant with each passing month.  Although anecdotal, in multiple cases after the 
court personally explained the savings provision and told the debtors that the court 
wanted them to succeed, the debtors responded by stating that they would not let the 
court down and that they appreciated the statement of confidence.   Multiple debtors 
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have made these comments through tears. The data suggests that these promises 
were not simply hollow gestures.  It is further noted that on several occasions in 
which cases failed, the debtors insisted on appearing and apologizing for their 
failure.  Perhaps this is the type of financial responsibility that BAPCPA was 
intended to generate. 
Part IV – Institutional Impact   
Debtors’ Attorneys 
 If, as the data suggests, debtors’ attorneys have a major impact on whether 
debtors elect to participate in the savings program, an understanding is needed as to 
why lawyers (i) recommend that debtors participate in the program; (ii) recommend 
that debtors not participate in the program; (iii) make no recommendation; or (iv) do 
not advise their clients about the program.  To begin to answer this question and 
understand the low utilization of the savings provision, the study next examined 
which lawyers had clients that elected to participate in the savings program.  Within 
the dataset of 339 cases, sixty-seven “firms”76 were identified that had filed at least 
one chapter 13 case on behalf of a client.  After examining the firms, two groups 
were created.  Group 1 consists of those firms that regularly send at least one attorney 
                                                 
76   A firm is defined as a solo practitioner or a group of attorneys practicing under a common firm 
name regardless of structure.  The only exception is that a single firm was created into which all 
pro se filers were placed in order to minimize the effects of these filings. 
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to a weekly in-court bankruptcy class77 or otherwise actively participate in local 
educational programs involving the judiciary.78  The remaining firms were placed in 
Group 2.  The composition of the groups is set forth in Table 5 below. 
Table 5 
 Group 1 Group 2 
Firms 13 54 
Cases filed 115 224 
Cases filed w/savings 
provision            76 18 
 
Table 6 is even more illustrative. 
                                                 
77   For several years, Judge 2 has taught a weekly class in his courtroom that is sponsored by the 
Houston Young Lawyers’ Association.  The purpose of the class is to teach courtroom techniques 
although the structure is largely driven by the participants.  Although attendance is voluntary, 
participation is required and the discussions are quite frank.  In recent classes, the group has 
focused on areas such as how to apply and understand basic financial ratios, how to construct a 
workable budget, how to negotiate a fee arrangement, etc.  Judge 2 also uses the class to talk about 
things he finds of particular importance such as the savings program.  Judge 2 continues to 
regularly refer to the savings program as a reminder to encourage continued use.  This study results 
confirm the suspicion that those young lawyers who regularly attend the class become better 
lawyers through the development of “good” habits. 
 
78  In the Southern District of Texas, there are “brown bag” educational programs that are given at 
least monthly.  The programs are held in a courtroom during the lunch hour with the typical format 
consisting of one or two judges talking about a specific subject.  The ensuing discussions are 
generally lively. 
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Table 6 
 
 Group 1 Group 2 
% of firms in group 19.40% 80.60% 
% of cases filed 33.92% 66.08% 
% of cases filed that use savings  66.09% 8.04% 
% of total saving cases filed            80.85% 19.15% 
 
  For cases that use the savings program: 
 
Chi2 = 127.39 
P < .0001 
 
Two conclusions are readily evident.  First, the choice of counsel plays almost a 
controlling role in whether the savings provision is utilized.  This is consistent with 
the notion that chapter 13 is a complex process and debtors generally accept their 
counsel’s recommendation without question.79  Second, and more important, the 
level of an attorney’s knowledge of and familiarity with the savings program directly 
dictates the debtors’ decisions regarding use of the savings provision.   
Attorneys in Group 1 utilized the savings provisions in over two-thirds of their 
cases—a percentage that seems logical80—versus approximately eight percent for 
                                                 
79   See National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years 79 (1997), 
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/05acons.pdf (stating that “[n]o area of 
bankruptcy law is more complex than consumer bankruptcy.”); Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer 
Bankruptcy Fee Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.17, 30 (Spring 2012) (noting 
100% failure rate in study of chapter 13 cases filed without an experienced attorney). 
 
80   In theory, the savings provision should be used in all chapter 13 cases filed by below-median 
debtors and a significant percentage of cases filed by above-median debtors.  In reality, the amount 
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Group 2.  It is significant that over eighty percent of the cases that use the savings 
provisions are filed by a smaller group of firms that are repeatedly exposed to an 
actively engaged judge that explains and answers questions about the savings 
program and how it works on a frequent basis.   
In a completely unscientific and anecdotal experiment, multiple debtors were 
informally questioned in court proceedings (not their counsel) about their decision 
not to use the savings program.  The results were remarkably consistent with the 
collected data.  Debtors represented by attorneys in Group 2 were generally not 
aware of the savings provision and did not understand how it worked or the benefits 
provided.  Debtors in Group 1 that had elected not to use the savings provision (i) 
had specific recollection of conversations with their counsel about the savings 
program; (ii) generally understood its existence and how the program worked; and 
(iii) had specific reasons for not electing the provision.  These debtors also generally 
had a better understanding of the overall chapter 13 process and their goals in the 
case.   In this sense, attorney education is debtor education. 
The Chapter 13 Trustee 
In defining the original scope of the study, two specific chapter 13 trustees 
were chosen.  These two trustees are nationally recognized and prior experience 
                                                 
of a debtor’s secured and priority unsecured debt along with confirmation criteria such as the best 
interest test may limit the ability to utilize the savings program.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 and supra 
note 64.  
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suggested that the two were ideologically similar in their administration of chapter 
13 cases. Logic would suggest that any device which increases the feasibility of 
chapter 13 plans would be accepted, if not embraced, by a learned chapter 13 trustee.  
Moreover, basic economic principals suggest that a chapter 13 trustee would be, at 
worst, neutral toward the savings program.  As set forth above in Part II, a chapter 
13 trustee is paid a percentage fee based on disbursements made in the case.  The 
longer a case lasts, the more money that is received and the more disbursements that 
are made.  The data suggests that these beliefs are incorrect.  To the contrary, a 
chapter 13 trustee’s personal views on the underlying issue of allowing a debtor to 
save money are incorporated into public expressions of policy which are acted upon 
by debtors’ attorneys. 
The impact of a policy statement by a chapter 13 trustee can shape the 
behavior of a local bar due to basic economic forces.  In the Southern District of 
Texas, a majority of chapter 13 cases are handled on a “no-look” fee basis.81  As 
previously mentioned, the requirements on counsel under BAPCPA are significant.  
                                                 
81   This is a process employed by many bankruptcy courts across the country.  Ordinarily, debtor’s 
counsel must file a written fee application with the court in order to receive compensation.  The 
fee application contains a detailed accounting of time spent and fees charged.  In the Southern 
District, attorneys are required to keep their time in one-tenth of an hour increments.  The cost of 
the fee application process is compensable and is not insignificant.  As chapter 13 cases involve 
relatively nominal fees, courts have implemented no-look fees.  A no-look fee is a fixed amount 
which an attorney will be paid for a chapter 13 case without the necessity of a fee application.  The 
fee is the same regardless of the amount time spent on the case.  In the Southern District, the no-
look fee is currently approximately $4,000. 
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It is relatively easy for an attorney to get into a loss position on a particular case.  
Moreover, an average chapter 13 practitioner has multiple cases pending at any 
given point in time.  Larger operations may file 15-20 cases or more per month.  
Each of those cases has a potential life span of five years.  The numbers quickly get 
large and profit/loss margins are magnified.  Attorneys pay close attention to the 
reactions of chapter 13 trustees to all new case authorities, rule changes and 
practices.  Repeated reactions become trends which then quickly become standard 
practices.  Further, attorneys justifiably worry that the consequences of actions taken 
in one case will have a spillover effect into unrelated cases.82  Attorneys adjust their 
behavior to incorporate these practices in order to guide their clients through the 
bankruptcy process with a minimum of friction.  Finally, few debtors have the 
resources to fund an appeal to test the validity of a trustee’s policy. 
Consequently, when a chapter 13 trustee expresses a view on the savings 
program, that view has an immediate impact on the attorney’s decision making. In 
the study, a perceived negative statement by Trustee 1 regarding the use of the 
savings program had a measurable effect on its use.  Even though Trustee 1 
apparently has no objection to minimal use of the savings program, it appears that 
                                                 
82   This is not to suggest that any attorney sacrifices the interests of one client for another.  Disputes 
between debtors and chapter 13 trustees routinely occur.  Thoughtful attorneys, however, always 
consider the consequences of their actions.   
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some attorneys have erred on the side of caution and simply avoided its use 
altogether.      
The Court    
 The notion that judicial support of a particular practice has an impact on the 
success of that practice is unsurprising.  The degree and method of support utilized 
by the judges in the study did yield a number of unexpected consequences.  First, 
the savings program was designed as an “opt-in” program.  To participate, a debtor 
must insert an amount into the box in paragraph 21 of the chapter 13 form plan.  At 
the time of the program’s design, it was believed that attempting to force debtors to 
utilize the savings provision would negatively impact its success.  The study showed, 
however, that Judge 1’s required or “strongly-encouraged” use of the savings 
program had no negative effect on its success once implemented.  To the contrary, 
the data suggests that these debtors performed better than those that voluntarily 
participated.  This suggests that mandatory participation in the savings program 
under certain circumstances such as in motions to extend or impose the automatic 
stay under § 362(d)(3) or (4) for repeat filers might be appropriate.   
 Second, personal interaction with the debtor by the court has an impact on the 
debtor’s view not only of the savings program, but of the bankruptcy process itself.  
Most debtors come to bankruptcy as failures in one form or another.  To have a judge 
encourage their success and to offer in plain English something that has an easy-to-
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understand monetary benefit provides self-motivation and a project/reward scenario 
that must be completed.  
 Finally, the frequency with which the court expresses its support of a practice 
impacts practitioners’ willingness to adopt that practice as normal behavior.  As 
discussed, once the savings program was approved, significant consideration was 
given to the manner in which it was presented to the bar.  While the continuing legal 
educational seminar were a start, the data reflects they were insufficient to achieve 
the desired goal.  Those attorneys that routinely interacted with a judge totally 
immersed in the concept more readily accepted and utilized the savings program 
versus those attorneys that were exposed to the program only once or twice in a 
formal setting.   
Part V- Conclusion 
 The savings program implemented in the Southern District of Texas is a viable 
tool for increasing the viability of chapter 13 plans.  From an economic perspective, 
it provides a legal means of assisting debtors in dealing with financial shocks that 
inevitably occur during the term of a chapter 13 plan.  I look forward with 
anticipation examining a future dataset containing a full five years’ worth of cases.  
In the interim, I find solace in the occasional debtor for whom I informally 
implemented plan in prior years obtaining a discharge and expressing gratitude for 
the assistance. 
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As demonstrated by the above study, the program’s effects are not limited to 
providing an economic buffer.  To the contrary, if properly implemented, the 
program serves as an incentive not only to debtors but to creditor constituents as 
well.  A chapter 13 plan that runs its term is a positive impact on society.  A debtor 
receives a discharge and goes on to immerse herself in the commercial world while 
creditors minimize their losses with meaningful distributions.   
A proper implementation of the savings program is dependent upon sufficient 
and repeated exposure of debtors’ counsel to the program and its benefits.  This 
necessarily educational programs that involve interaction with the judiciary.  
Second, chapter 13 trustees must embrace the program and encourage its use. 
Finally, all members of the judiciary must be knowledgeable about the savings 
program and actively promote its use. 
As for the Southern District of Texas, we will refocus our efforts on education 
not only of our bar but of current and future members of the bench.  For the lawyers 
that regularly attend my class, I return on Thursday, a little less sure of who is 
teaching who. 
